This is the title I chose for my personal blog, which is meant to give me an outlet for one of my favorite crafts – writing – plus to use an image from my favorite sport, golf.  Out of college, my first job was as a reporter for the Daily Astorian in Astoria, Oregon, and I went on from there to practice writing in all my professional positions, including as press secretary in Washington, D.C. for a Democrat Congressman from Oregon (Les AuCoin), as an Oregon state government manager in Salem and Portland, as press secretary for Oregon’s last Republican governor (Vic Atiyeh), and as a private sector lobbyist.  This blog also allows me to link another favorite pastime – politics and the art of developing public policy – to what I write.  I could have called this blog “Middle Ground,” for that is what I long for in both politics and golf.  The middle ground is often where the best public policy decisions lie.  And it is where you want to be on a golf course.

Remember the “head of a pin”analogy?

I have used it a couple times recently to indicate that I do not know a lot about some stuff.  Like technology.

But, this time, I used it to describe what littie I know about what has become a routine matter in pro football:  “Analytics.”

A story appeared in the Wall Street Journal to portray what happened that enabled the Detroit Lions to lose a football conference championship game against the San Francisco 49ers.

The result, the story said, came down to analytics.

The story appeared under this headline:  “What Ended the Detroit Lions’ Dream Season? Math:  Lions coach Dan Campbell swears by going for it on fourth down, and analytics support him.  But in the NFC title game, the numbers didn’t work out.”

More from the story:

“The Detroit Lions led the San Francisco 49ers by 14 points midway through the third quarter of the NFC Championship, and they were in position to pour it on with a field goal.  That’s when coach Dan Campbell made the decision that defied a basic doctrine of traditional football thinking. 

“The Lions went for it on fourth down.  They didn’t get it.  Then they proceeded to blow their shot at the Super Bowl. 

“In the second half, the Lions twice turned the ball over on downs when they were in position to kick a field goal.  Those decisions potentially cost them six points in a game they lost by three.”

But the story adds that, “in truth, the aggressive fourth-down calls are more a reflection of the modern NFL than they are a brazen anomaly.  These types of calls are increasingly common because they’re supported by analytics, and in both instances on Sunday, statistical models aligned with Campbell’s calls.  That type of forward thinking is one of the reasons for Detroit’s turnaround under him—until it backfired in spectacular fashion.”

Now, for me, at best an armchair watcher of pro football, especially near the end of the season (though I may forego the Super Bowl, with all its hype and not much football), going for it on fourth down on nearly all occasions has the potential for backfire.

To his credit, Campbell, the coach, took full credit – or, perhaps, debit – for the “going-for-it” decisions. 

Here is a summary of how it went.

• Up 24-10 near the middle of the third quarter on Sunday, Campbell faced a fourth-and-2 situation with an obvious choice, per old-school football logic.  A made kick would have put him up three scores, forcing the 49ers to muster at least two touchdowns and a field goal over the rest of the game.  But Campbell instead put the ball in quarterback Jared Goff’s hands, and a pass to Josh Reynolds was broken up.

Despite the outcome, Campbell’s decision was backed by something better than his gut. It’s called data. One popular model said the Lions had an 85 per cent chance of winning by going for it, and 82 per cent if they kicked the field goal.

• Later, with less than 10 minutes left in the fourth quarter and the Lions now trailing by three, Campbell faced another critical decision on a fourth-and-3.  Again, the model recommended going for it.  This time, it boosted Detroit’s win probability to 28 per cent versus 26 per cent kicking the field goal. 

The Lions’ offense stayed on the field, the defense pressured Goff, and another pass fell incomplete.

So, analytics, the head-of-a-pin issue for me.

As a fan, I like it because it adds interest to the game.  And, if a coach like Campbell takes responsibility for any decision, that’s good for the game, too.

And, speaking as a fan, I like the two outcomes last week – the Kansas City Chief over the Baltimore Ravens and the 49ers over the Lions.  Regarding the latter, it also would have been fun to see the Lions make the Super Bowl, having not made the trip for so many years.

But, it’s the 49ers…my team, if, in fact, I have one.